A recollection on the difficulty of conflict resolution in Manipur, as it survives in a suffocating and peripheral corner as one of the Indian provinces plagued by issues of unrest and insurgency
KAPIL ARAMBAM
About the conflict situation in Manipur today, perhaps the less said, the better. Bordering Burma to the south and east, Assam to the west, Nagaland to the north and Mizoram to the south, the province is home to numerous armed organisations fighting for issues ranging from sovereignty and the right to self-determination to the formation of administrative districts. For the government, these issues have been bracketed with problems of unemployment, law-and-order condition or at worst, domestic issues of the union. Such an approach—without the consideration of political and historical narratives—is utterly ineffective, which is quite apparent from the fact that Manipur is also home to one of the oldest armed movements for liberation in the world today.
We can find countless literature on prolonged conflict situations in India, but unfortunately, when it comes to discussion on their resolution, the reference is made from the State’s perspectives and hardly from that of its constituents and primary stakeholders in most of the cases.
Any discourse on conflict resolution in Manipur tends to produce two sides: One, if you are against the government and the army, then you are anti-India or you are too Manipur-centric. People would often question which armed organisations this side is affiliated to or sympathises with. Two, if you stand for the present union of India, then it is highly likely that your political integrity is considered to be compromised. In most cases, the second side belongs to conformists, conservatives and apolitical subjects.
Each side comes with its share of justification but with objectionable reasons. For instance, the pro-liberation side is usually seen as a group of people who are narrow-minded and consumed with ‘regional’ aspirations, and who cannot think beyond a province or at least that is how other people (read mainland Indians) interpret the condition.
Nevertheless, if we have to talk about Manipur then inevitably we need to consider the fact that many of India’s ‘positive’ aspects, which are shown by its economic growth, success stories of liberalisation and FDIs, a self-reliant government and the likes, are no less than alien terms in the province. Picture this. India is the largest democracy while we have a state with heavy militarisation as well the army playing a substantial role in civil administration. The country is one of the emerging economies in the world, while we are trapped in a developmental time-warp. These are just a couple of random examples.
It follows that we have to locate India in this conflict—not only because it is a party to the conflict but also as a whole of the parts. It is a given that geographically, Manipur is stuck in a literal periphery but when it comes to solving the problems, its location needs to be moved towards the centre. Coincidentally, radical guerrillas believe that revolution must start from the countryside and end at the centre. For Manipur, the starting and the ending points are seemingly a chimera.
One of the origins of the present conflict lies in the merger of Manipur into India by coercion. The erstwhile kingdom had transformed from a monarchy to democracy, with its own elected representatives and a written Constitution. India, in 1949, did not even have its Constitution but by virtue of its strength and manipulation, it annexed the independent infant ‘nation-state’ through arm-twisting methods while disregarding all sorts of existing political norms and international laws.
Today, it has become the issue of a minority group, further moving away from the distant centre. Identity and security have been one of the most sensitive issues cutting across ethnicity. Fortunately for India, whenever there is miscommunication between any of these groups, it is the easiest task to drive a wedge and so far its action plans have been quite successful as evident from the ongoing Indo-Naga peace talks. It blissfully ignores some of the major armed groups, while the present Home Minister claims the insurgent issue, generalising all the provinces, will be resolved by 2024.
History is witness to the fact that a more powerful centre will always dictate and capitalise on the periphery in politics, economics and even in the domain of culture. This is also apparent from the never-ending process of Indianisation in Manipur.
A major contention from the mainland is that India is a developing country and that there are numerous territories and people, who have no access to the most basic infrastructure needed in the 21st century. However, here is a rejoinder. A majority of them had existed as a people with a common history, culture and tradition or briefly, they share the idea of Indian nation-hood unlike in some of these strife-torn provinces like Manipur and Nagaland.
Besides the historical and cultural gaps, there are also numerous cases of violations and subjugation. Earlier this year, the Indian Express published a news report: ‘Rights group on Manipur encounters: No forces personnel indicted by CBI’, that mentioned the ‘Human Rights Alert and Extrajudicial Execution Victim Families Association Manipur had earlier filed a petition in the Supreme Court to probe into as many as 1,528 alleged fake encounters in Manipur, which they claimed were perpetrated by the Army, paramilitary forces and Manipur Police.’ (The Indian Express, 12 January 2020)
The problem is with the periphery and its inability to occupy a central position for varying reasons. One of the causes is New Delhi’s strategic moves to make Manipur over-dependent. Political observers express that New Delhi has been using the four Kautilyan principles of reconciliation-split-force-and-monetary inducement to solve the crisis of insurgency, but ground realities tell a different story.
Ironically, the matrix is illustrated in inimitable ways. With the rise of political mobilisation in the hilly areas of Manipur, the Meiteis have become the irresponsible Big Brother while the Nagas—hopefully—are only a few agreements away from signing the final peace deal, if we go by official reports. Somehow, Nagaland, under the aegis of NSCN (IM), has been able to place itself favourably in this political theatre. Good for them but the reality remains unchanged: we live in the periphery and a lot of conditions are set at the centre with consent or without. The current stalemate between the IM group and the Government of India, with both the sides blaming each other for stalling the peace process, is a consequence of this politics without consent.
Manipur is trapped in the periphery but not as any entity that can detach itself easily. For the province, with an international border merely 120 kilometres away to its east, the elected representatives have to go 2,400 kilometres towards the west, to New Delhi precisely, to air the mortal grievances. No wonder then, all it has are internal issues that can be solved amicably but which has hardly been done so. Unconsciously, the province is also helping itself to remain isolated from the centre, with much thanks to the native apologists and the representatives and their ilk. It may be because of the lack of political will or agency or vision; and that, only the people can tell.
To conclude, the result might not be achieved instantly by moving towards the centre. Since it is unimaginable with the present economic condition, the armed organisations believe their tactics have the leverage to do so.
One way or the other, Manipur needs a fresh pair of eyes to re-look into its absurd politics. In the meantime, though as elusive as it may seem, its search for locating itself away from the periphery continues.∎
